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Hong Kong y el fin del colonialismo inglés: 1997-2007 / Hong Kong and the end of the English colonialismo |
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Contenidos disponibles en
español y en inglés - Availables resources in spanish and english -
Compilador
Jorge T Colombo
Ocho años antes los tanques en Tiananmen habían puesto en la picota el proceso de apertura económica impulsada por el régimen comunista, así que las previsiones para el día después en Hong Kong no podían ser más apocalípticas. Unos veían ya al Ejército Popular de Liberación desfilando por las calles hongkonesas, otros aventuraban que la plaza financiera sería engullida por la voracidad del gigante asiático, otros hablaban del fin de las libertades. La crisis, pensaron muchos, era inevitable.
Un país, dos sistemasTal era la inseguridad que destilaba el status quo que iba a estrenarse, el de "un país dos sistemas", que por aquel año la diáspora de ciudadanos británicos no había hecho más que empezar: hoy, una década después, sólo quedan en Hong Kong unos 25.000 de los 175.000 británicos que allí residían en 1996. El primer día bajo soberanía china se saldó con un inmejorable debut, disparando la bolsa a máximos históricos. Pero al día siguiente, el 2 de julio, el mercado de valores se derrumbó. El baht tailandés entró en barrena y produjo el colapso en cadena de varias economías asiáticas, entre ellas la de Hong Kong. A partir de entonces, la antigua colonia se vio en la tesitura de tener que emprender una increíble carrera de obstáculos que duró hasta 2004. Y es que, primero, se desató la crisis financiera asiática. Llegó después el pinchazo de la burbuja puntocom, a continuación el brote de gripe aviar y luego la recesión en EEUU y el terrorismo del 11-S, para culminar con el zarpazo del SARS. Los desastres, mayúsculos e imprevisibles, se sucedieron uno detrás de otro. Pero ninguno podía achacarse a Pekín. "Fueron cosas que no se habían anticipado. Todo lo que nos podía afectar, ocurrió. Y todo lo malo que ocurrió fuera de Hong Kong nos golpeó", recuerda David O'Rear, economista jefe de la Cámara de Comercio de Hong Kong. Paradójicamente, la política no tuvo tiempo de influenciar como en un principio se creyó. "Los factores externos difuminaron los propios efectos de la retrocesión de la soberanía", explica O'Rear.
Parálisis de su economíaDurante aquellos años de depresión todo se paró: se desplomó el mercado inmobiliario, se hundió el consumo, creció el paro, se frenó el crecimiento. En 2003, en pleno SARS, Hong Kong tocó fondo: cerraron comercios y restaurantes y se evaporó un 40 por ciento de los extranjeros de la ciudad. Fue entonces cuando, a petición de Hong Kong, Pekín intervino directamente -y por única vez en 10 años- en la política económica de la isla. "Fue Pekín quien ayudó a salir del bache. Autorizaron a los chinos a viajar a Hong Kong sin visado y con ello incentivaron el despegue del sector minorista", señala José Luis García-Tapia Bello, consejero de la Oficina Económica y Comercial de España en la ex colonia. Durante esa época, el 70 por ciento de los turistas provenían de China continental. "Gastan lo mismo que los europeos o estadounidenses pero no en hoteles de cinco estrellas sino en las tiendas, con lo que su contribución a la economía local es indudable", advierte O'Rear acerca del turismo chino, que hoy representa el 55 por ciento de los 25 millones de turistas que recibe la isla al año. Ello marcó la resurrección económica de la plaza financiera, que volvió -hasta hoy- a la cresta de la ola con dos años seguidos de crecimiento al 7 por ciento, la recuperación del mercado inmobiliario, el repunte del consumo y el empleo en máximos. En esa recuperación, obviamente, mucho tuvo que ver también el arrollador ciclo de bonanza en la economía mundial, ya que dos tercios de la economía hongkonesa depende del comercio.
Pero hubo más factores"Hong Kong se ha convertido en este tiempo en el gran motor del delta del río Perla, que acoge al otro lado de la frontera unas 400.000 fábricas, de las cuales casi 60.000 son hongkonesas", asegura García-Tapia. En Cantón fue precisamente donde Deng Xiaoping, el presidente chino impulsor de las reformas en los 80, creó tres de las cuatro Zonas Económicas Especiales del país, auténticos laboratorios del capitalismo pensados para atraer la inversión extranjera con el anzuelo de la liberalización legal y las exenciones fiscales, con objeto de monitorizar su evolución antes de implantar el sistema a nivel nacional. En ese contexto, Hong Kong supo aprovechar sus vínculos históricos y culturales con China para ser los primeros en participar de lleno en el milagro chino. Desde entonces, la isla ha invertido 273.000 millones de dólares en China, prácticamente lo mismo que el resto de países del mundo juntos. También ha podido, gracias a ello, acometer una transición tranquila desde una economía basada en la producción a otra de servicios. Pero su primacía y destacado rol en el gigante asiático se los debe también a la protección que le ha brindado el acuerdo de libre comercio firmado con Pekín en 2003. Éste garantiza que una mayoría de productos hongkoneses entren libres de impuestos en territorio chino, a la vez que ha dado acceso preferencial a las compañías de Hong Kong del sector servicios. En otras palabras, frente a los temores del intervencionismo de Pekín previos a 1997, hoy hay unanimidad en que China ha sido la chispa que ha permitido el renacer de la economía de Hong Kong. La tercera pata del citado acuerdo con China fue el consentimiento de Pekín para conceder a la antigua colonia el estatus de centro financiero internacional. "Ello multiplicó la voluntad de muchas compañías internacionales de querer salir a bolsa en Hong Kong", asegura David O'Rear. La retrocesión de la soberanía a China, el crecimiento brutal del gigante asiático y la avalancha de salidas a bolsa han convertido a Hong Kong en la ciudad financiera más importante del este y sureste de Asia, según este economista. "Desde Alemania a EEUU, Hong Kong se ha convertido en la última década en un centro financiero global", remata.
El futuro pasa por ChinaUna década después, parece inevitable que el futuro de Hong Kong esté irremediablemente vinculado a China, tal como así ha sido a lo largo de casi toda la Historia. Si el gigante continúa escalando económicamente a su ritmo actual, Hong Kong será uno de los lógicos beneficiarios que podrá capitalizar el furor actual por China. De hecho, el momento de retornar a la madre patria, en plena apertura y prosperidad de China, quizás no pudo elegirse mejor. Pero incluso si la economía china se ve menoscabada en el futuro por alguna de las múltiples amenazas que la acechan, Hong Kong siempre podrá erigirse en alternativa. Para muchos, la mejor decisión de Pekín con respecto a su nuevo y rico territorio durante estos 10 últimos años ha sido, precisamente, el no intervenir. "Desde 1997, Pekín sólo quiere una cosa de Hong Kong: que no sea problemática. Que no cause problemas financieros, políticos o sociales", señala el profesor Yan, de la universidad Tsinghua. |
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The region of Hong Kong, which had long been barren, rocky, and sparsely settled—its many islands and inlets a haven for coastal pirates—was occupied by the British during the Opium War (1839–42). The colony prospered as an east-west trading center, the commercial gateway to, and distribution center for, S China. It was efficiently governed, and its banking, insurance, and shipping services quickly became known as the most reliable in SE Asia. In 1921 the British agreed to limit the fortifications of the colony, and this contributed to its easy conquest (Dec. 25, 1941) by the Japanese. It was reoccupied by the British on Sept. 16, 1945. After 1949, when the Communi sts took control of mainland China, hundreds of thousands of refugees crossed the border, making Hong Kong's urban areas some of the most densely populated in the world. Problems of housing, health, drug addiction, and crime were the target of aggressive governmental programs, and Hong Kong's long-standing water problem was eased by the construction of an elaborate system of giant reservoirs and the piping in of water from China. In May, 1967, Hong Kong was struck by a wave of riots and strikes inspired by China's Cultural Revolution. The government reacted firmly, and, although the Chinese retaliated by briefly stopping the piping of water and by attacking British representatives in Beijing, relations between Hong Kong and China soon resumed the surface harmony that had existed since the late 1950s. After several years of negotiations, on Dec. 19, 1984, Britain and the People's Republic of China agreed that Hong Kong (comprising Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New Territories) would become a special administrative region of China as of July 1, 1997, when Britain's lease expired. Declaring a policy of “One Country, Two Systems,” China agreed to give Hong Kong considerable autonomy, allowing its existing social and economic systems to remain unchanged for a period of 50 years. The crackdown in 1989 at Tiananmen Square in Beijing inspired fears that China would not respect Hong Kong's autonomy, and in the next few years many business people left, affecting Hong Kong's economy. In 1991, Hong Kong's first direct legislative elections (which accounted for about 30% of the seats) were won almost entirely by liberal, prodemocracy candidates, and no pro-China candidates were elected. In 1992, Britain introduced a number of democratic measures, which were denounced by China. Talks between the two countries proved fruitless, and in 1994 Hong Kong's legislature approved further democratic reforms in the colony in defiance of strong Chinese objections. In the subsequent elections (1995) prodemocracy candidates received about 60% of the popular vote. Upon Hong's return to China, Beijing abolished the legislature set up by the British and established a provisional legislature; a chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, was also appointed. Elections were held in 1998, with prodemocracy parties taking 16 of the 20 directly elected seats (the rest of the 60 seats were mostly chosen by professional constituencies). Hong Kong was affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, but its economy began to rebound in 1999. A setback to Hong Kong's independent judicial system occurred in 1999, when Beijing overturned a Hong Kong court ruling that had granted residency to children born in mainland China who had at least one parent living in Hong Kong. In the Sept., 2000, legislative council elections, prodemocracy parties won 15 of the 24 directly elected seats. Tung was reelected as chief executive in 2002. Although not popular, he was supported by the Chinese government, and no other candidate was nominated by the electoral committee responsible for electing the executive. In 2003, Hong Kong's economy was hurt by measures undertaken to control an outbreak of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), which spread there from China. A trade agreeement was signed with China in June; the pact gave Hong Kong businesses greater access to Chinese markets. Proposed new antisubversion laws led to significant antigovernment demonstrations the following month, and Tung subsequently withdrew the legislation. In Apr., 2004, the Chinese government ruled that Hong Kong would have to petition China in order to make any changes in its electoral laws, including increasing the number of legislators chosen by direct election. In 2004 half the legislators were directly elected, but prodemocracy forces won a total of only 25 seats in the election, which was fiercely contested and marked by heavy-handed Chinese tactics. Tung resigned in Mar., 2005, and was replaced as chief executive by Donald Tsang, who had been chief secretary. Tsang subsequently resigned to campaign for election to the post, which he secured in June. Two governmental reform proposals failed to pass in late 2005 when prodemocracy legislators rejected them as constituting minor tinkering with the laws governing the election of the chief executive and the size of the legislature. Tsang was reelected chief executive in Mar., 2007. Donald Tsang - BBC - Sunday, 25 March 2007
Donald Tsang, re-elected on Sunday as Hong Kong's leader, remains a popular figure. A recent survey found Hong Kong's chief executive is almost as well-liked now as when he first succeeded Tung Chee-hwa just under two years ago. This is despite widespread unhappiness about the slow pace of democratic reform under his leadership. An 800-member committee of officials loyal to Beijing determined the outcome of Sunday's election, with Hong Kong's seven million residents having no direct say. Skilled administrator A career civil servant and former deputy to Mr Tung, Mr Tsang is respected for his skills as an administrator, his calm demeanour and his strong financial acumen. In contrast to his predecessor, he is also flamboyant, articulate and deals well with the media. But critics of his period in office say he has lacked the political expertise and strength of personality to juggle the expectations of a restive public, a divided legislature and the Beijing government. In particular, his aborted efforts to introduce some limited democratic reforms into Hong Kong's political system were heavily criticised. Mr Tsang, 62, was born in October 1944, the son of a Hong Kong police officer. Unlike most senior civil servants in Hong Kong, he did not attend university, joining the colonial government in 1967. He is married with two sons, with hobbies said to include hiking, swimming and bird watching. Apart from a spell in the 1980s when he was working on details of Hong Kong's transfer from British to Chinese sovereignty, most of his career prior to taking the top job in 2005 was focused on financial matters. After a succession of trade and economic roles, he was appointed financial secretary in 1995 - the first Chinese person to hold the position. It was in this role that he chose to intervene in Hong Kong's stock market during the financial crisis of the late 1990s. The move protected it from speculators and won Mr Tsang praise. With his financial background, it is no surprise that Mr Tsang's stewardship of Hong Kong's economy over the past two years has won him admirers. The economy has grown strongly in each of the past two years and unemployment has fallen to a seven-year low. Democracy dilemma Mr Tsang was made a Knight of the British Empire just before the 1997 handover and many said he had been too close to Britain for Beijing to accept him. But despite his colonial associations and the fact he is a devout Catholic, Mr Tsang has maintained amicable relations with Beijing. His popularity and experience initially made him the stabilising force Beijing was looking for. But the legislature's decision to reject his reform proposals early last year, disappointed that they did not go far enough, were a slap in the face. Some observers said his reputation in Beijing may be seriously damaged by the setback but Mr Tsang has bounced back, focusing instead on strengthening the economy. But the clamour for more popular representation is likely to define his second term in office. Although he says there is no consensus on what democratic model Hong Kong should adopt, Mr Tsang has promised to resolve the issue during his next five years in power. He has not ruled out direct elections - allowed for in Hong Kong's constitution - but has given no indication of when this could happen or, indeed, if they ever will. |
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